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Abstract 
The need for justification is a widely observed social phenomenon. This paper develops a 
theoretical framework and reports laboratory evidence to show how pure justification pressure 
affects cooperative behavior in economic exchange environments. In a one-shot anonymous 
interaction, compared with the case when the behavior is simply observed by the audience, 
individuals are more likely to act on what they believe the audience thinks they should do when 
they also have to explain the decisions to the audience.  When it is salient that the audience 
thinks one should cooperate, justification pressure significantly promotes cooperation even 
absent negative consequences for non-cooperative behavior. We discuss the implications of our 
findings for shaping institutional design to promote cooperation. 
Keywords: justification, accountability, cooperation, social norms, experimental economics 
JEL classification: C91; C72; D63; D03; D83; D84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements. I thank Linda Babcock, Cristina Bicchieri, Daniel Houser, Sera Linardi, 
John Miller, Justin Rao, Fangfang Tan and participants at a seminar at the University of 
Pittsburgh and the 2011 ESA meeting for valuable comments. I gratefully acknowledge the 
National Science Foundation (SES-0961341) for funding that supported this research.   
2	  
	  
I. Introduction 
When people take actions or make judgments, they are often expected to or feel obliged to 
provide a justification. This is as true for trivial decisions in daily life as it is for critical national 
policy making. Justification may even be mandatory when an action has negative consequences 
for others.  For example, a manager is often expected to provide explanations when deciding to 
fire an employee. Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) announced 
that health insurance providers will need to justify rate increases of 10% or more starting 
September 1, 20111.  In the past several decades, research in psychology has argued that an 
important universal feature of decision-making environments is that people are accountable for 
their decisions, and provided evidences that the social necessity of this accountability has a 
significant impact on shaping peoples’ thoughts (see Lerner and Tetlock (1999) for a 
comprehensive review).  While the pressure of justification has been discussed in psychology 
literature on accountability, how it affects behavior in exchange environments has received little 
attention and has been unjustifiably quiet in economic literature, despite its importance in 
predicting economic outcomes.2  For instance, in addition to promoting transparency, we may 
expect the pure pressure of justification imposed by HSS’s new policy to have an impact on 
health insurance providers’ pricing decisions. If the need to provide justification influences a 
manager’s hiring and firing decisions, these conditions can have a significant impact on labor 
market outcomes.  
 In this paper, we provide both a theoretical framework and laboratory evidence to explain 
how the requirement of justification affects cooperative behavior in economic exchange 
environments. The theoretical framework is built on previous psychology research on 
accountability and on norm obedience.  Tetlock (1985) proposed a social contingency model of 
judgment and choice to understand how accountability influences behavior, mostly in the domain 
of judgment. In this model he assumes that people tend to be "cognitive misers," in that they rely 
on simple heuristics to make judgments quickly. When people believe they will have to justify 
their views, if they are unconstrained by past commitments they will try to anticipate the possible 
objections from the audience and adopt the salient, socially acceptable position. The proposed 
underlying mechanism of the accountability effect is that, if people do not behave in ways for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/05/20110519a.html (accessed on January 7, 2012)  
2 The only related economic research papers we are aware of include, Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2011), Vieider 
(2010), and Brandts and Garofalo (2010). We discuss these papers in Section II.	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which they can provide acceptable accounts, they will be evaluated negatively by others and 
suffer negative reputational consequences.  Thus, accountability manipulation in previous 
empirical research often involves not only pure justification (that is, providing explanations for 
one’s behavior or views) but also other factors such as the presence of others (subjects expect 
someone will observe their behavior); identifiability (subjects’ decision or opinion will be linked 
to them personally); or evaluation (subjects expect someone will evaluate their performance) (see 
Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Thus, the impact of pure justification remains unclear. In addition, 
most studies on accountability have focused on judgment accuracy or social perception, but no 
systematic studies have been conducted to investigate how the pure justification necessity 
influences economic behavior when there is temptation to pursue self-interest at a cost to others. 
Applying previous psychology findings on accountability effects, we argue in this paper 
that the pure pressure of providing explanations can reduce selfish behavior in an economic 
exchange environment even absent negative consequences for selfishness such as bad reputation.  
The reason is that the pressure of justification can remind one to think about what the audience 
thinks, as suggested in the Tetlock (1985) model. Furthermore, previous research on social 
norms shows that, subjects’ behavior is more likely to be consistent with their beliefs regarding 
what others think they should do when social norms are more salient (see, e.g., Collins and 
Loftus, 1975; Harvey and Enzle, 1981; Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 2006; and Bicchieri and 
Xiao, 2009).  If the expectation of justification promotes the salience of social norms in guiding 
behavior, it can reduce profit-maximizing behavior in economic exchange environments when it 
violates social norms even if the decision maker does not bear any monetary cost of bad behavior. 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that the pressure of justification is more effective in promoting 
cooperation when it is clearer to the subjects that the audience disapproves of profit-maximizing 
behavior.  
 To test these hypotheses, we design an experiment based on a dictator game and a trust 
game that have been widely used to study prosocial behavior. We revise these two games so that 
to maximize one’s own profit at the cost of others, the subject has to violate multiple norms such 
as truth telling, efficiency, fairness, and reciprocity. Selfish behavior is thus presumably less 
acceptable compared with standard dictator games or trust games. We also design the payoff 
structure of the games such that selfish behavior violates different norms in different conditions. 
In particular, in some conditions behaving selfishly is less acceptable than in others because it 
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leads to more severe norm violations.  We compare subjects’ behaviors between two treatments: 
Justification and No Justification. The only difference between the two treatments is that the first 
requires the subject to provide explanations for her behavior to a third party.  
We find that when subjects are not required to justify their behavior, most will maximize 
their own profit at the cost of their counterpart in all the conditions. In contrast, in the 
Justification treatment, subjects are significantly less likely to choose the profit-maximizing 
action when such a choice is clearly not acceptable. To further test the hypotheses, we conduct 
an incentivized survey to elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding what the audience thinks they should 
do. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that when justification is required, subjects’ 
behavior is more likely to be consistent with their expectations of what the audience thinks they 
should do. The effect of justification on cooperation is thus stronger when it is clearer that the 
audience thinks the subjects should cooperate.  
 This study contributes to the understanding of how the pressure to justify behavior can 
influence cooperation in an economic exchange environment - even within the context of 
anonymous one-shot interactions. Further, our findings provide important insights into how to 
design institutions to promote pro-social behavior. Incentive mechanisms, such as penalties or 
rewards, have been widely used to enhance cooperation. In relation to incentive mechanisms, 
building institutions to require justification for decisions, such as HSS’s new justification policy, 
can be a less costly way to increase social welfare.  In addition, justification mechanisms may 
avoid the potentially negative effects of incentives. Previous research shows that external 
incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations and lead to less cooperation (e.g., Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000; Houser, et al., 2008; and Li, et al., 2009). In contrast, this paper suggests that 
justification pressure may enhance intrinsic motives for norm conformity by prompting one to 
consider others’ perceptions of the right thing to do in a particular decision context. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related literature. 
Section III introduces experiment design. Section IV presents theoretical analysis. Section V 
reports results. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Literature Review 
II.A. Justification and accountability in psychology literature  
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The effect of justification on judgment and decision making has been widely discussed in 
psychology literature on accountability. Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit 
expectations that one may have to provide reasons for his or her beliefs, feelings, or actions to 
others (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Tetlock, 1992). This expectation can place constraints on 
virtually everything people do as the failure to provide an acceptable account for one’s behavior 
can lead to punishment and disapproval (Tetlock, 1992).  
In his seminal work, Tetlock (1985) proposed and tested a social contingency model of 
how accountability affects judgment and choices. The model assumes that people tend to rely on 
simple, low-effort heuristics to make decisions. When people know the views of the audience to 
whom they are accountable and are unconstrained by past commitments, they tend to adopt 
views or actions that will be accepted by the audience. When people do not know the views of 
the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they may be motivated to engage in a 
preemptive self-criticism process to try to anticipate the objections of potential critics. Finally, if 
people have already committed to a position, they will try hard to generate arguments supporting 
the position.  Because this paper explores how the pure justification necessity can change 
behavior, we focus on situations where people anticipate having to justify their behavior before 
they take an action. Tetlock’s model may suggest that the effect of justification would be 
different if people have made a choice in a similar environment in the past.  
Psychologists have conducted numerous experimental studies to examine the effect of 
accountability on judgment and decisions. Many of those studies have focused on the effect of 
biases in decision-making. For example, when the audience’s view is unknown, accountability 
can reduce the anchoring effect (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983), overconfidence (Siegel-Jacobs 
and Yates, 1996), sunk cost fallacy, oversensitivity to the order that the information is presented 
(Webster et al., 1996), and conjunction error (Simonson and Nye, 1992). Accountability also 
amplifies some biases. For example, Simonson and Nowlis (1998) found that accountability 
increases preferences for compromise options and loss aversion. Taylor (1995) found 
accountability increases ambiguity aversion. Accountability has also been found to have no 
effect on some biases, such as insensitivity to the base rate and preference reversal  (Simonson 
and Nye, 1992; also see Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, for a comprehensive review).  
Recent studies have also investigated the effect of accountability on cooperative behavior 
in social dilemmas. However, in addition to requiring explanations for one’s decision, the 
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manipulation of accountability in these studies often involves the presence of others; 
identifiability; or evaluation. For example, De Kwaadsteniet, et al. (2007) show justification 
pressures facilitate coordination in common resource dilemmas when there is no uncertainty 
about the resource size. As indicated in their paper, the justification manipulation is quite strong 
because subjects not only have to justify the behavior to the group members but their decisions 
would also become identifiable.  De Cremer and Van Dijk (2009) show that subjects who have 
great endowments also contribute more in a public goods game when they were told that after 
making the decisions they would meet up with other group members and explain their 
contribution decisions. Thus their paper cannot inform pure justification effects on cooperation 
either.  
The need to justify can be made not only explicitly to others, as studied in the 
accountability literature, but also implicitly to oneself, which can also affect one’s behavior. For 
example, Shalvi, et al. (2011) show that people are more likely to lie if self-justifications for 
lying are available. This paper focuses on the effect of exogenous justification pressure when it 
has to be made explicitly to others. Nevertheless, in the theory model discussed below, we 
include the case when the target group is the subject himself, which reflects the possibility that 
the individual has internal pressure to make a decision that can be justified to himself or herself.  
 
II.B. Justification and accountability in economic literature 
Economists have only recently drawn attention to the importance of accountability. Recent 
economic research on accountability effects has focused on risk choices.  The accountability 
manipulation in these studies, however, often involves not only pure justification pressure but 
also identifiability.  For example, Vieider (2010) showed when the subjects know they have to 
explain their choice to an experimenter face-to-face, they increase the effort in solving the 
decision task and are more likely to choose the normatively superior event.  Pahlke, Strasser, and 
Vieider (2011) studied how individuals make decisions when they take risks that affect 
themselves and a passive recipient and found less loss aversion when the subjects have to explain 
their decisions to the recipient face-to-face. Brandts and Garofalo (2010) adopted physiological 
measurements to study gender difference in accountability effects when individuals are asked to 
choose between simple and compound prospects. In their accountability manipulation treatments, 
subjects have to explain decisions in front of an audience.  Our study contributes to this 
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emerging literature in two ways: first, we examine the effect of pure justification pressure on 
decision making without introducing identifiability; second, we extend the study of justification 
effects to the domain of prosocial behavior in economic exchange environments.  
Some experimental research on communication is related to our study, although these are 
not designed to study justification directly. For example, Andreoni and Rao (2011) show that 
allowing a dictator to send a message to a receiver in a dictator game leads to more selfish 
behavior, but the dictators are more generous when the receivers can send a message to them. 
Unlike the dictator game, where the right thing to do is unclear (see Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009), in 
this paper, we investigate the affect of justification in a setting where a selfish act can clearly be 
viewed as bad because it violates multiple norms including truth-telling, efficiency, reciprocity, 
and equality. As discussed in more detail below, for justification to promote cooperation decision 
makers must clearly understand that the audience believes the decision makers should not pursue 
their own self-interest.  
 
II.C. Social norms 
Economic research connecting norms and decisions is only beginning to emerge (see, e.g., Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Gächter, et al., forthcoming). People do not 
always behave how society thinks they should. In the absence of monetary incentives, even a 
strong personal commitment to a social norm does not predict norm-obedient behavior unless 
that norm is a focus of attention (Bicchieri, 2006). This concept has received substantial attention 
in the law and economics literature (see, e.g. Kahan, 1998; Cooter, 1998; and Sunstein, 1996) 
and has been heavily researched by psychologists.  
For example, drawing from the Collins and Loftus (1975) theory of semantic memory, 
Harvey and Enzle (1981) proposed a cognitive model of social norms and norm-directed 
behavior. In their model, cooperation is more likely after observing a transgression, because 
doing so draws attention to a cooperation norm. Experimental studies have also provided 
supporting evidence that people are more likely choose what they expect others think they ought 
to when this normative message is salient (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; and Bicchieri and Xiao, 
2009).  
Building on previous studies on accountability and social norms, we develop a theoretical 
framework and conduct an experiment to show how pure justification pressure itself can affect 
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cooperative behavior. The theory can help explain why, in some situations, justification pressure 
may or may not influence behavior and thus shed light on how to incorporate justification 
requirements in institution design to promote cooperation. We argue that the justification 
pressure can prompt one to think about what the audience thinks he or she should do (i.e., what is 
the norm) and it can promote cooperation in environments where selfish behavior is clearly not 
acceptable. 
 
III. Experiment Design 
The experiment consists of two treatments: No Justification and Justification. In each treatment, 
subjects play two games with a different randomly paired partner. The two games are designed 
so that the same decision may be more acceptable in one and less so in the other. In both games 
to make a selfish decision requires a subject to violate multiple norms.  
 
III.A. No Justification treatment 
In this treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to the role of either Person A or Person B and 
play two games. Each Person A is randomly matched with a different Person B in each of the 
two games. This is common knowledge. We randomize the order of the two games to control the 
potential order effect. At the end of the experiment, one of the games is randomly selected and 
subjects will be paid by the amount they earned in this game.  
 In Game D, subjects are told that the computer will first pick one of three possible 
earnings outcomes: ($10, $2), ($7, $7), and ($5, $9). The first numbers in the parentheses are 
Person A’s payoff and the second numbers are Person B’s payoff.  Person A will see what 
earnings outcome the computer selected for his pair, but Person B will never receive this 
information. Person A will then decide what to report to Person B regarding the real computer-
selected earnings outcome, and Person A’s report will decide each one’s final earnings. For 
example, if the computer selected (7,7) but Person A told Person B that the computer selected 
(10,2), then Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2 in this game.  Person A is told that 
he can either tell the truth or tell a lie.  All this is common knowledge. 
In this game, the profit-maximizing outcome for Person A is (10,2). When the computer 
selects (7,7) or (5,9) for the group, Person A has to tell a lie and scarify efficiency to seek his 
own interest (i.e., to report (10,2)). An important feature of the game is that it is reasonable to 
9	  
	  
assume that Person A will believe to report (10,2) when the computer selects (5,9) is relatively 
more acceptable than when the computer selects (7,7). The reason is that when the true 
computer-selected outcome is (5,9), Person A has to accept disadvantageous inequality if he tells 
the truth. In contrast, in the case when the true computer-selected outcome is (7,7), Person A not 
only has to lie and scarify efficiency but also has to violate equality to report (10,2) to Person B.  
 In Game T, Person B first chooses whether to opt “out” or “in.” If Person B opts out, 
Person A’s and Person B’s final earnings in this game are $4. If Person B opts in, then each 
one’s earnings will be decided by the same procedure as described in Game D. That is, the 
computer first picks one of the three possible outcomes and then Person A decides what to report 
to Person B regarding the computer-selected earnings outcome, which will decide each one’s 
final payoff.   
Previous studies show that people are more likely to cooperate when others have signaled 
positive intentions (e.g., McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003).  In view of those findings, we 
assume that the when computer selects (7,7) or (5,9), to report (10,2) to Person B is less 
acceptable in Game T than in Game D. The reason is that in Game T, by opting in, Person B has 
trusted Person A to be honest, and Person B would have received $4 by opting out if he had 
chosen not to trust Person A, in which case Person A would only receive $4.  
 Because we are mostly interested in the cases when the computer-selected outcome is 
either (7,7) or (5,9), to obtain enough data in each case, we design the experiment so that most 
pairs receive one of these two outcomes. Because we are also interested in whether subjects 
behave differently in Game D than in Game T, subjects receive the same outcome in both games.  
Subjects are not told about the probability of receiving each of the three possible outcomes and 
do not know that the computer will assign the same outcome to their group in both games. They 
are simply told that the computer will select one of the outcomes for their group and their 
decision in one game will not affect their payoff in the other game. To avoid a learning effect, 
subjects are told they will not see the outcomes of each game until the end of the experiment. 
(See instructions in Appendix A for details.)  
 To keep this treatment as symmetric as the Justification treatment described below, 
participants also are told that at the end of the experiment, two Person Bs who didn’t play either 
Game D or Game T with Person A will be randomly selected and each of the two Person Bs will 
see the true computer-selected earnings outcome and his report in the corresponding game.  
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III.B. Justification treatment 
The only difference between the two treatments is that, in the Justification treatment, subjects are 
asked to provide explanations for their decisions to the Person B who will observe the report and 
the truth.  To study a pure justification effect without any reputation effect or other extrinsic 
incentive effect such as punishment or reward, we introduce the weakest justification 
manipulation in this treatment. Person A is required to write at least two different explanations 
for his decision when deciding what to report. Note that the subject was not explicitly asked to 
“justify” his decision but just “to provide at least two different explanations,” so as not to suggest 
to the subjects that they should do what the audience thinks they should do.  
In addition, the explanations will not affect his payoff but will be seen by another Person 
B who did not play either of the two games with the Person A.  In particular, the Person B who 
sees the explanations will also see Person A’s report and the true computer-selected earnings 
outcome. However, the matched Person B involved in each game is not allowed to see Person 
A’s explanation. This assures Person A that his matched Person B in each game will not know if 
he told the truth or not, just as in the No Justification treatment. This feature also mitigates the 
potential concern that the process of justification may change the social distance between Person 
A and his matched Person B. All of this is common knowledge.  
 
III.C. Belief elicitation 
We argue that the pure justification requirement makes subjects more likely to behave 
consistently with what they believe others think they should do because the social norm is more 
salient in decision making when subjects are required to justify their behavior (see Section IV for 
more details). Thus, it is important to know about a subject’s belief in this regard.  
In the experiment, after the subjects finished all the decisions in both games in each 
treatment, we conducted an incentivized survey (see Appendix B for details). Subjects could earn 
points for answering some questions. At the end of the experiment, two of the survey questions 
that Person A can earn points for were randomly selected, and Person A was rewarded $2 for 
each point he earned.   The most relevant question for our purpose was the second question: 
“Before seeing what you actually reported to your matched Person B, he/she was asked to 
indicate what he/she thought you should report. Please guess what this Person B’s answer is. 
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You will earn one point if your answer is the same as what this Person B answered in his/her 
survey.”3  This question is intended to elicit Person A’s normative expectations about what the 
audience thinks he should do (see Bicchieri and Xiao, 2010).4  As illustrated in section IV, the 
comparison between Person A’s behavior and his normative expectation can help explain how 
the justification requirement influences behavior.  
 
III.D. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at P.E.E.L. lab using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were 
randomly and anonymously assigned a role and the role was fixed for the whole experiment.  At 
the end of the experiment, one game was randomly chosen and each subject was paid according 
to the outcome in that game. Subjects were paid privately. Each subject participated in exactly 
one treatment. 
  
IV. The Role of Justification  
Based on the previous literature on accountability and social norms, we argue that the need to 
justify can decrease selfish behavior that harms others because it leads people to be more likely 
to think about what behavior is approved by the audience when deciding what to do, and thus 
social norms are more salient in the decision-making process. When the norm clearly 
disapproves of selfish behavior, people are more likely to be cooperative when they are required 
to justify their behavior. To illustrate how the justification condition influences individual 
choices, we construct a utility function along the lines of the Bicchieri (2006) norm-based utility 
function and incorporate justification conditions.  
In Bicchieri’s (2006) social norm model, an individual’s utility function consists of two 
parts: his own payoff from the strategy he takes and the disutility from norm violations. A norm 
here is defined as the individual’s belief of what others think ought to be done (i.e., normative 
expectations).  The disutility from norm violations depends on (1) the difference between the 
profit from one’s action and the profit if one takes an action based on the norm, and (2) the 
individual’s sensitivity to the relevant norm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Data for all survey questions are available on request.  
4 The “normative expectation” identified here is a bit different than the normative expectation studied in Bicchieri 
and Xiao (2009), who asked for subjects’ beliefs about what the majority thinks one should do.   
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 In this paper, our hypothesis is that the need to justify promotes the salience of the social 
norm because it leads the individual to think about what behavior is approved by the audience to 
whom he justifies. We construct an individual i’s utility function as follows: 
Ui (si) =πi (si) - ki (J) |πi (si)  - πi (sti)| 
where si is the action individual i takes and sti is the strategy that the individual i believes the 
target group thinks he should do (i.e., normative expectations). The target group is any group to 
whom the individual i believes he must justify his behavior. It can be a third party as designed in 
this experiment, or the partner, or even the individual himself. In the equation, πi (si) is individual 
i’s profit when he takes action si ;  πi (sti) is individual i’s profit when he takes action sti ; and ki 
represents the individual’s sensitivity to the normative expectations of the target group. The latter, 
ki , is a function of the probability J in [0,1] that the individual believes he needs to justify his 
behavior to the target group. We assume: 1) ki>0, that is, individual i experiences disutility from 
norm violations; and 2) ∂ki /∂J >0, that is, the more likely one has to justify his behavior, the 
more sensitive he is to the normative expectations held by the target group. Note that ki (J) |πi (si)  
- πi (sti)| also captures the ease with which an individual can justify his behavior.  When the 
action taken by the individual is closer to what he believes the target group believes he should do, 
it is natural to assume that it is also easier for him to provide acceptable reasons for his behavior 
to the target group. Thus, ki (J) |πi (si)  - πi (sti)| can also be interpreted as the psychological cost 
of justifying his behavior to the target group.  
This model suggests that the need to justify does not always lead to behavioral 
differences; particular conditions need be satisfied in order for justification to have behavioral 
consequences. To see this, consider a simple setting similar to the experiment designed here. In 
this setting, a subject has two choices: to lie (L) or to be honest (H), si ∈(L, H).Consider the case 
when πi (L)>πi (H), as studied in the experiment. Further consider two justification conditions: 
justification is surely not needed (J=0) and justification is required with probability one (J=1). 
Without loss of generality, assume that ki (0)=0.  It is straightforward to see that when 
justification is not required the subject will choose to lie. When justification is required: 
Ui (si=L | J=1)= πi (L) - ki (1) |πi (L)  - πi (sti)| 
Ui (si=H | J=1)= πi (H) - ki (1) |πi (H)  - πi (sti)|. 
In this case, differences in decisions between Justification and No Justification treatments occur 
whenever Ui (si=L | J=1)< Ui (si=H | J=1). Consider two cases:  
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Case 1. sti=H  (i.e., the subject expects the audience to believe she should be honest) . 
In this case when πi (L) - ki (1) |πi (L) - πi (H)|< πi (H) - ki (1) |πi (H)  - πi (H)|, Ui (si=L | 
J=1)< Ui (si=H | J=1) is satisfied. It is straightforward that the justification requirement would 
lead to more honest behavior when ki (1)>1. That is, more honest behavior occurs under the 
justification condition when subjects believe the audience believes they should be honest, and 
when subjects are sufficiently sensitive to this normative expectation.  
 
Case 2. sti=L  (i.e., the subject expects the audience to believe she should tell a lie).  
In this case, again, when πi (L) - ki (1) |πi (L)  - πi (L)|< πi (H) - ki (1) |πi (H)  - πi (L)|, Ui 
(si=L | J=1)< Ui (si=H | J=1) is satisfied. It is straightforward that this condition cannot be 
satisfied regardless of the value of ki (1) because πi (L)>πi (H). In other words, the expectation 
justification requirement does not promote honesty when subjects believe the audience believes 
they should lie, regardless whether subjects are sensitive to the normative expectation.  
 
Thus, the model suggests that the pure justification effect can significantly reduce lying 
behavior when there exists a sufficiently large number of subjects who 1) believe the audience 
disapproves of lying behavior and 2) are sufficiently sensitive to norm violations.  We next apply 
this model to derive several hypotheses relevant to our investigation.  
First, as mentioned above, subjects are presumably more likely to expect the audience to 
think they should be honest when the truth is (7, 7) than when the truth is (5,9) (i.e., Prob 
(sti=H|truth=(7,7))> Prob (sti=H|truth=(5,9)). The reason is that, in addition to violating 
efficiency and truth telling that apply to both (7,7) and (5,9) cases, to report (10,2) when the truth 
is (7,7) also violates equality. Moreover, when the truth is (5,9), subjects may believe the 
audience believes it is acceptable to lie by reporting (7,7) as in this case lying creates equality. 
Thus, for each particular game (Game D or Game T), it should be more likely that justification 
pressure promotes honest behavior when the truth is (7,7) than when the truth is (5,9).  Second, 
in view of previous studies on reciprocity (e.g., McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003), we expect 
the probability that subjects believe the audience thinks they should be honest is higher in Game 
T than in Game D (i.e., ProbGameT (sti=H) > ProbGameD (sti=H)). The reason is that in addition to 
violating truth-telling and equality that apply to both Game D and Game T, Person A in Game T 
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also fails to reciprocate when reporting (10,2) because Person B has chosen to trust him. Thus, 
ceteris paribus, pure justification pressure is more likely to promote honest behavior in Game T 
than in Game D. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Pure justification pressure is more likely to reduce profit-maximizing behavior when (1) the 
truth is (7,7) than when the truth is (5,9), and (2) in Game T than in Game D.   
In the experiment, we elicit beliefs regarding what the target group thinks one should do 
(normative expectations). We test our model by examining the difference between normative 
expectations and behavior in the two treatments. As discussed above, the model predicts that 
Person A is more likely to choose what is acceptable to the audience (sti ) when Person A is 
required to  explain his decision (J=1). Thus, our second hypothesis is:   
H2:  Compared with the No Justification treatment, people are more likely to choose what they 
believe the audience thinks they should do in the Justification treatment. 
 
V. Results 
We ran 16 sessions in total (8 sessions for each treatment) and obtained observations on 334 
subjects: 170 subjects in the Justification treatment, 164 subjects in the No Justification 
treatment.5  Since we are interested in the cases when the true computer-selected earnings 
outcome is (7,7) and (5,9), we designed the experiment so that in each session most pairs receive 
either (7,7) or (5,9).  
As discussed above, it is more likely that subjects expect the audience to think they 
should not report (10,2) for the (7,7) condition than for the (5,9) condition.  Thus, the (7,7) 
condition has a greater chance to reveal the effects of justification requirements. In view of this, 
we also design the experiment so that more pairs receive (7,7) than (5,9). In total, we obtain 87 
observations for the (7,7) condition (43 in the No Justification treatment and 44 in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Due to the software problem, in the No Justification treatment, one Person A who was supposed to be assigned to 
the (5,9) condition in both Game D and Game T did not play Game D and reported (10,2) in Game T. Another 
Person A received different earnings outcomes from the computer: (7,7) in Game D and (5,9) in Game T and this 
Person A reported (10,2) in both games. We exclude these two in the data analysis reported here. We also exclude 
an outlier Person A in the No Justification treatment who seemed to misunderstand the experiment and reported (5,9) 
when the computer-selected outcome was (7,7) in Game T. The subject wrote in the ex post survey that in the first 
game (Game T) he assumed in the second game person B would have to choose between “in” or “out,” even though 
it was clearly stated in the instructions that Person A’s decision in one game does not affect his payoff in the other 
game and Person A is randomly matched with a different Person B in the two games. Thus, the data reported here 
include 85 Person A’s in the Justification treatment and 79 Person A’s in the No Justification treatment. Including 
these three Person A’s does not change the conclusions.  
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Justification treatment); 61 observations for the (5,9) condition (28 in the No Justification 
treatment and 33 in the Justification treatment) and 16 observations for the (10,2) condition (8 in 
each treatment). This is summarized in Table 1.  
When the computer-assigned earnings outcome is (10,2), 7 out of 8 Person As reported 
the truth in Game D in both the Justification and the No Justification treatments; 6 out of 8 
Person As reported the truth in Game T, also in both treatments. Below we focus on the cases 
when the computer-assigned earnings outcome is (7,7) or (5,9). We first report Person A’s 
decisions to test H1 then, to test H2, we examine how many Person As chose exactly what they 
believed the audience thought they should do in each condition. All messages are listed in 
Appendix C. 
 
V.A. Justification and lying 
When Person A sees the computer’s selected earnings outcome is (5,9), he can either report the 
truth or lie. There are two types of lies in this condition: to report (7,7) or (10,2). In both case, 
Person A’s earnings are higher than the computer-assigned. Compared with the profit-
maximizing decision of reporting (10,2), to report (7,7) can reach equality and maintain 
efficiency.  When the computer-selected earnings outcome is (7,7), there is only one type of lie: 
to report the profit-maximizing outcome (10,2).  Figure 1 plots the proportion of lies in each 
treatment and each condition.  
 As shown in Figure 1, consistent with our hypothesis, the rate of lying is always higher in 
the No Justification treatment than in the Justification treatment. The comparison of lying rates is 
significant in Game T when the true computer-selected outcome is (7,7) (39% vs. 63%, Z-test, 
p=0.02). We also find that the comparisons in the other five cases are not significant (Z-tests, 
p>0.50). Thus, the finding that the justification requirement significantly reduces the probability 
of reporting (10,2) when the computer assigns (7,7) in Game T but the effect is not significant 
when the computer assigns (5,9) or when play in the Game D setting supports our first 
hypothesis.  
 Each Person A plays both Game D and Game T and receives the same computer-selected 
earnings outcome in each game. Again, to avoid an order effect, we randomize the order of the 
two games. We did not observe a significant order effect in this experiment. It is interesting that, 
as shown in Figure 1, there are no significant behavioral differences between Game D and Game 
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T in the No Justification treatment regardless whether the truth is (7,7) or (5,9) while previous 
research shows that people are more likely to share with the partner if the partner has signaled 
trust (see Cox, 2004; McCabe, et al. 2003). However, in the Justification treatment, when the 
truth is (7,7), Person As are significantly less likely to report (10,2) in Game T than in Game D 
(39% vs. 55%, Wilcoxon sign rank test, p=0.03). The reporting behavior does not differ 
significantly between Game D and Game T when the truth is (5,9) (Wilcoxon sign rank test, 
p>0.10).6  
One explanation is that, unlike the standard trust game, in this experiment, Person A’s 
partner Person B never knows whether a good (or bad) outcome is generated by a computer or by 
Person A’s positive (or negative) intention. If the reason the trustee reciprocates to the trustor is 
that the trustee does not want the trustor to feel betrayed (e.g., Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 
Aimone and Houser, 2011), this concern does not exist or is present to a lesser degree in the 
experiment. However, in the Justification treatment, the requirement of justification draws 
subjects’ attention to what the audience thinks. Thus any differences in the normative 
expectations among these conditions can lead to behavioral differences.  
It is worthwhile to note that the belief data elicited by our survey are consistent with this 
explanation.  In the Justification condition, Person As are significantly more likely to believe that 
the audience thought they should tell the truth when assigned (7,7) in Game T than in Game D 
(89% vs. 77%; Wilcoxon sign rank test, p=0.03). When the truth is (5,9), in both Game T and 
Game D, only a small proportion of Person As believed the audience thought they should tell the 
truth (27% in Game T vs.  24% in Game D, Wilcoxon sign rank test, p=0.57). Thus, even though 
Person A’s matched Person B does not know the truth in the Justification treatment, they are 
more likely to tell the truth in Game T than Game D when the truth is (7,7) but not when the 
truth is (5,9). We next examine the belief data obtained from the survey to provide further 
information on how the justification manipulation affects behavior.  
 
V.B. Justification and beliefs 
Recall that our second hypothesis is that Person A is more likely to choose what he believes the 
audience thinks he should do (normative expectation) when justification is required than when it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The percentage of Person B’s who chose “in” is not significantly different between treatments (67% in the No 
Justification treatment and 66% in the Justification treatment choose “in” Z-test, p=0.87). 
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is not required. To examine this hypothesis, we calculate the percentage of subjects whose 
reporting behavior is exactly the same as their normative expectation. We plot the data in Figure 
2. As shown in Figure 2, compared with No Justification treatment, more subjects in the 
Justification treatment report exactly the same as their normative expectations.    
 We ran an OLS regression to test whether this percentage is higher in Justification than 
No Justification (pooling across both (5,9) and (7,7) conditions)7. Each Person A plays both 
Game T and Game D. We conduct a regression analysis for Game T and Game D separately. The 
regression results are reported in Table 2. The dependent variable “consistent” is equal to one if 
Person A’s choice is the same as his normative expectation, and zero otherwise. For independent 
variables, we first include only the treatment variable “Justify” (Regression 1 and Regression 3 
in Table 2). We then separate the (5,9) and (7,7) conditions (Regression 2 and Regression 4). As 
shown in Table 2, the treatment variable “Justify” is positive and significant in Regression 1 and 
Regression 3. In Regression 2 and Regression 4, the coefficients for “Justify*Assigned(5,9)” and 
“Justify*Assigned(7,7)” are jointly positive (F-test, one tail, p=0.02 for Regression 2 and p=0.04 
for Regression 4).  
 It is also interesting to note that we find the proportion of Person A’s who believe the 
audience thinks they should be honest is significantly higher in the Justification treatment than in 
the No Justification treatment when assigned (7,7) in Game T (88% vs. 65%, Z-test, p<0.01).  
We did not observe significant differences between the two treatments for the other three cases 
(assigned (7,7) in Game D and assigned (5,9) in Game D and Game T). We discuss possible 
explanations in the next section.  
 
VI. Discussion 
The need for justification is ubiquitous within society. The way justification pressure impacts 
decisions is highlighted in the accountability literature, where the focus is on judgment and 
perception (Lerner and Tetlock,1999). Recently, economists have investigated how 
accountability affects risky decisions (e.g., Vieider, 2010; Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider, 2011; 
and Brandts and Garofalo, 2010). Despite these advances, there remains a lack of systematic 
evidence informing whether and how justification pressure influences prosocial behavior in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Probit regressions generate qualitatively identical results. Here we report OLS regression results because it is easier 
to interpret the coefficients.  
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economic exchange environments, especially in the important case where selfishness results in 
negative externalities. 
This paper developed a theoretical framework to assess the effect of justification 
requirements on decisions. We argued that justification requirements – even absent payoff 
consequences - lead people to consider and consequently act on what they believe others believe 
they should do. We hypothesize that requiring one to justify their actions can reduce selfish 
behavior when it is clear that selfishness is not acceptable to the audience.  Our data support this 
hypothesis. In one-shot anonymous interactions, subjects are more likely to avoid profit-
maximizing choices, and instead to pursue cooperative outcomes, when they are required to 
justify their behavior in a context where selfish decisions are clearly unacceptable. 
Our data also offers evidence that the need to justify may change people’s expectations 
regarding what observers believe they should do (represented by sti in our model). An 
explanation is that the need to justify may reshape people’s perceptions as they try to anticipate 
objections of potential critics (as discussed above in the Literature Review).8 This mechanism 
can potentially enhance the effect of justification on promoting cooperation. The reason is that 
the need to justify both leads people to choose what they expect the audience thinks they should 
do and also brings their expectation more closely in line with what the audience actually thinks 
they should do.  
 Previous studies suggest that when subjects can send a message to their partner they act 
selfishly and then try to excuse their selfish behavior (e.g., Andreoni and Rao, 2011). In addition 
to framing differences regarding the function of messages, our study differs from others in that 
we design our games so that selfish actions clearly violate multiple norms. Thus, the difference 
between our findings and previous findings might suggest the importance of ensuring the 
transparency of the standard held by the target group. Another important way our study departs 
from earlier investigations is that a decision makers behaviors do not have material impact on the 
audience.  
Our study extends previous research on accountability by showing that justification 
pressure can have significant behavioral consequences in economic exchange environments. 
Although we exclude the effect of identifiability in order to focus study pure justification effects, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In this experiment, compared with other cases, it is presumably easiest to see that to lie is unacceptable when the 
computer assigned (7,7) in Game T; thus, this is probably the easiest case for people to change their normative 
expectations when they have to justify their behavior.  
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our findings provide an explanation for why cooperation is more likely in environments that 
include high transparency and publicity. In addition to reputation concerns, it is reasonable to 
argue that people expect it is more likely that they will have to justify their behaviors to others 
when their decisions are made public (e.g. Linardi and McConnell, 2011).   
This paper also contributes to the theoretical literature on accountability and norm 
obedience, as well as to institution design. The literature has demonstrated the importance of 
social norms to decision making. Nevertheless, our understanding of how social norms influence 
behavior, especially in the absence of monetary incentives such as penalties, is still limited.  The 
present study suggests that the need to justify decisions - a universal feature of human interaction 
- may play an important role in facilitating norm obedience. In particular, when people expect 
they will need to provide explanations for their behavior they are more likely to conform to 
norms even when there is no extrinsic incentive tied to such obedience.  
 Finally, our findings have practical implications for institution design. In particular, our 
results highlight the importance of formal requirements for justification in promoting socially 
desirable behavior. Indeed, many institutions explicitly request leaders and policy makers to 
explain decisions (e.g., the HSS’s new policy requiring justification for increases in health 
insurance premiums). Our study suggests that this policy may indeed leave it more likey that 
health insurance companies set reasonable premiums. Another example is corporate boards, 
which are often required to explain their actions to shareholders (see Model Business Corporate 
Act, section 8.30, 2008). In addition to helping people understand and support board policies, an 
advantage to this is that narrowly self-interested decisions can be effectively deterred by 
requiring the board to justify.   
20	  
	  
References 
Aimone, J. and Houser, D. 2011. “Beneficial Betrayal Aversion,” PLoS ONE, 6(3): e17725. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017725 
Andreoni, J. and Rao, J. 2011. “The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, 
empathy, and altruism”, Journal of Public Economics, 95(7), 513-520 
 
Bicchieri,C. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006 
Bicchieri, C. and Xiao, E. 2009 "Do the right thing: But only if others do so",  Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making.22(2), 191-208. 
Bohnet, I. and Richard Z. “Trust, Risk and Betrayal.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 2004, 55 (4), 467-484. 
 
Brandts, J. and Garofalo, O. 2010. “Gender pairings and accountability effects”. Working paper. 
Cialdini, R. B.; Kallgren, C. A. and Raymond R.1990,"A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: 
A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior.” 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 201-234. 
Cooter, R. D. “Expressive Law and Economics, Journal of Legal Studies 27(2), 585-608 
Collins, A. M. & Loftus, E. F. “A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing.” 
Psychological Review, 1975, 82, 407-428. 
Cox, J. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 260–
281. 
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher,U. “Social norms and human cooperation.” TRENDS in Cognitive 
Sciences, 2004, 8 (4), 185-190. 
Fischbacher, Urs (2007): z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, 
Experimental Economics 10(2), 171-178.  
Gächter, S. Nosenzo, D. and Sefton, M. (forthcoming) "Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: 
Social Norms or Social Preferences?" Journal of the European Economic Association  
Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A. 2000a. A Fine Is A Price. Journal of Legal Studies. 29(1), 1-17. 
Harvey, M. D. and Enzle, M. E. “A cognitive model of social norms for understanding the 
transgression-helping effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, 41, 866-875. 
21	  
	  
Houser, D. Xiao, E., McCabe, M. and Smith, M. 2008. “When punishment fails: Research on 
sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation”, Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (2), 509-532. 
Kahan, D. M. (1998) “Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime. Journal of Legal 
Studies 27(2), 661-672. 
Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: Effects 
on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping and numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 19, 448-468 
Krupka, E. L. and Weber, R. (2009); “The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro 
Social Behavior” The Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(3):307-320. 
De Kwaadsteniet, E.W., Van Dijk, E., Wit, A., De Cremer, D.,  De Rooij, M. (2007).  “Justifying 
Decisions in Social Dilemmas: Justification Pressures and Tacit Coordination Under 
Environmental Uncertainty”. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 33(12), 1648-60 
 
De Cremer and Van Dijk (2009) “Paying for sanctions in social dilemmas: The effects of 
endowment asymmetry and accountability”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes. 109, 45-55 
 
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological 
Bulletin, 125(2), 255-275 
 
Li, J., Xiao, E., Houser, D. and Montague, R. 2009, “Neural responses to sanction threats in two-
party economic exchange”,  PNAS. September 29, vol. 106 no. 39, 16835-16840 
 
Linardi, S. McConnell, M. A. (2011) “No Excuses for Good Behavior: Volunteering and the 
Social Environment” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 5-6, 445-454  
 
McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., Smith, V. 2003. Positive reciprocity and intention in trust games. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations. 52(2), 267-275. 
 
Model Business Corporate Act (2008) section 8.30, 2008 
Pahlke, J., Strasser, S. and Vieider, F. M. (2011). “Risk-Taking for Others under Accountability”, 
working paper 
Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33(1), 46-62. 
Siegel-Jacobs, K., & Yates, J. F. (1996). Effects of procedural and outcome accountability on 
judgment quality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 1-17. 
Simonson, I., & Nowlis, S. (1998). Constructive decision making in a social context: 
Unconventional choices based on reasons. Working paper, Stanford University. 
22	  
	  
Simonson, I., & Nye, P. (1992). The effect of accountability on susceptibility to decision errors. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 416-446. 
Sunstein, C. R. “On the Expressive Function of Law”. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
1996,144. 2021-2031 
Shalvi. S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J.J. De Dreu, C. K.W. 2011. “Justified ethicality: Observing 
desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes. 115,181–190 
Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 48(3), 227-236. 
Tetlock, P. E. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social 
contingency model. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 331-376. 
Vieider, F.M., 2010. “Separating Real Incentives and Accountability”. Working paper.  
Webster, D. M., Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). On leaping to conclusions when 
feeling tired: Mental fatigue effects on impressional primacy. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 32, 181-195. 
  
23	  
	  
Figure 1. Lying behavior by treatments
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Figure 2.  Percentage of Person As whose reporting behavior is the same as the normative 
expectation by treatments. 
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Table 1. Experiment conditions and the number of observations 
                                                                           Treatment 
Computer assigned  
earnings condition Justification No Justification 
(10,2) 8 8 
(5,9) 33 28 
(7,7) 44 43 
Note: The first number in the parentheses is Person A’s earnings and the second one is Person 
B’s earnings.  
 
 
Table 2.  OLS regression analysis of Person A’s reporting behavior 
 
  
Dependent variable:  
Consistent =1 if reporting behavior is the same as the normative 
expectation; =0, o.w. 
Game D Game T 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression3 Regression 4 
Justify 
=1 if Justification Treatment 
=0 o.w. 
0.17** 
(0.06) 
 0.19** 
(0.08) 
 
Justify*Assigned(5,9)  0.17* 
(0.10) 
 0.14 
(0.11) 
Assigned(5,9)  0.25*** 
(0.05) 
 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
Justify*Assigned(7,7)  0.17 
(0.12) 
 0.24** 
(0.11) 
Assigned(7,7)  0.47*** 
(0.11) 
 0.44*** 
(0.08) 
_cons 0.38*** 
(0.06) 
 0.37*** 
(0.07) 
 
Note: numbers in the parenthesis are the robust standard error.  
*** significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
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Appendix A. Instructions 
 
• Game D in Justification Treatment   
In this task, you are randomly matched with another participant. One plays as Person A and the other 
plays as Person B. Person A’s and Person B’s final earnings are decided by the following steps: 
 
Step 1: For each group, the computer will select one of the following three possible earnings outcomes. 
Each of the three possible earnings outcomes specifies Person A’s and Person B’s earnings.  
• Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9 
• Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7 
• Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2 
•  
Step 2: Person A will see the computer-selected earnings outcome for his/her group. Person B will not 
see the computer-selected earnings outcome. Neither will B see the real computer-selected earnings 
outcome throughout today’s experiment.  
 
Step 3: Person A decides what to report to Person B regarding the computer-selected earnings outcome.  
Person A can choose either to tell the truth or tell a lie.  A and B will receive earnings based on the 
earnings outcome A reports to B.  
 
For example, suppose the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group was “A receives $7 
and B receives $7.”  After seeing this outcome,  
o If A told the truth and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is 
A receives $7 and B receives $7”, then A’s final earnings are $7 and B’s final earnings are 
$7.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $5 and B receives $9,” then A’s final earnings are $5 and B’s final earnings are $9.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $10 and B receives $2,” then A’s final earnings are $10 and B’s final earnings are 
$2.  
 
Person B will see Person A’s report and therefore each one’s earnings in this task at the end of the 
experiment. Person B will never know what the real computer-selected earnings outcome is throughout 
the experiment.  
 
When A decides what to report to B, A must also provide at least two different explanations for his/her 
decision.  
 
At the end of the experiment, one Person B who has never been matched with Person A in the decision 
tasks will be randomly selected and this Person B will review Person A’s message of explanations. In 
particular, this Person B will see the following information of your group:  
1) the real computer-selected earnings outcome in decision task 1  
2) Person A’s report and explanations of his/her decisions in decision task 1. 
 
Person A should write his/her explanations message in the following format.  
27	  
	  
 
 “I decide to tell the truth and report to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $__ and B receives $___” because first...; second…; ……” 
Or  
“I decide to lie and report to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $__ 
and B receives $___” because first...; second…; ……” 
 
Please note: Person A should not identify him/herself by name, ID number, gender, or appearance. 
Person A should write a message to explain his/her decision using the format described above.  Any 
violation of these requirements will result in Person A forfeiting all earnings and receiving only the $5 
show-up bonus.  
 
• Game T in Justification Treatment 
In this task, you are randomly matched with another participant. One plays as Person A and the other 
plays as Person B. Person A’s and Person B’s final earnings are decided by the following steps:  
 
Step 1: Person B decides to either choose “In” or “Out.”  
 
• If Person B chooses “Out,” the final earnings for both Person A and Person B is $4 each. 
 
• If Person B chooses “In,” then the final earnings for Person A and Person B will be decided by the 
three steps described below.  
 
Step 2: In the case where Person B chooses “In,” the computer will select one of the following three 
possible earnings outcomes. Each of the following three earnings outcomes specifies Person A’s and 
Person B’s earnings.  
• Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9 
• Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7 
• Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2 
 
Step 3: Person A will see the computer-selected earnings outcome for his/her group. Person B will not 
see the computer-selected earnings outcome. Neither will B see the real computer-selected earnings 
outcome throughout today’s experiment.  
 
Step 4: Person A decides what to report to Person B regarding the computer-selected earnings outcome. 
Person A can choose either to tell the truth or tell a lie.   
If “In” is B’s actual choice in Step 1, A’s report will be carried out and A and B will receive earnings 
based on the earnings outcome A reports to B.  
 
Note that Person A will not know whether Person B has chosen “In” or “Out” when deciding what 
earnings outcome to report to B. However, since A’s report will only make a difference when B has 
chosen “In,” we ask A to presume that B has chosen “In” for the purpose of making this decision. 
 
For example, suppose B chose “In” and the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group 
was: “A receives $7 and B receives $7.” After seeing this outcome:  
o If A told the truth and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is 
A receives $7 and B receives $7,” then A’s final earnings are $7 and B’s final earnings are 
$7.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $5 and B receives $9,” then A’s final earnings are $5 and B’s final earnings are $9.  
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o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $10 and B receives $2,” then A’s final earnings are $10 and B’s final earnings are 
$2.  
 
In the case where B’s actual choice in Step 1 is “In,” B will see A’s report and therefore each one’s 
earnings in this decision task at the end of the experiment. B will never know what the real computer-
selected earnings outcome is throughout the experiment.  In the case where B’s actual choice in Step 1 
is “Out,” B will not see either A’s report or the real computer-selected earnings outcome. In this case, A 
and B’s final earnings will be $4 each.  
 
When A decides what to report to B, A must also provide at least two different explanations for his/her 
decision.  
 
At the end of the experiment, one Person B who has never been matched with Person A in the decision 
tasks will be randomly selected and this Person B will review Person A’s message of explanations. This 
Person B will also be different than the Person B who was randomly selected to review Person A’s 
message in decision task 1. In particular, this Person B will see the following information of your group:  
1) the real computer-selected earnings outcome in decision task 2 
2) Person A’s report and explanations of his/her decisions in decision task 2. 
 
Person A should write his/her explanations message in the following format.  
 
“I decide to tell the truth and report to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $__ and B receives $___” because first...; second…; ……” 
Or  
“I decide to lie and report to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $__ 
and B receives $___” because first...; second…; ……” 
 
Please note: Person A should not identify him/herself by name, ID number, gender, or appearance. 
Person A should write a message to explain his/her decision using the format described above.  Any 
violation of these requirements will result in Person A forfeiting all earnings and receiving only the $5 
show-up bonus.  
 
• Game D in No Justification Treatment 
In this task, you are randomly matched with another participant. One plays as Person A and the other 
plays as Person B. Person A’s and Person B’s final earnings are decided by the following steps: 
 
Step 1: For each group, the computer will select one of the following three possible earnings outcomes. 
Each of the three possible three earnings outcomes specifies Person A’s and Person B’s earnings.  
• Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9 
• Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7 
• Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2 
 
Step 2: Person A will see the computer-selected earnings outcome for his/her group. Person B will not 
see the computer-selected earnings outcome. Neither will B see the real computer-selected earnings 
outcome throughout today’s experiment.  
 
Step 3: Person A decides what to report to Person B regarding the computer-selected earnings outcome.  
Person A can choose either to tell the truth or tell a lie.  A and B will receive earnings based on the 
earnings outcome A reports to B.  
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For example, suppose the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group was “A receives $7 
and B receives $7.”  After seeing this outcome,  
o If A told the truth and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is 
A receives $7 and B receives $7,” then A’s final earnings are $7 and B’s final earnings are 
$7.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $5 and B receives $9,” then A’s final earnings are $5 and B’s final earnings are $9.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $10 and B receives $2,” then A’s final earnings are $10 and B’s final earnings are 
$2.  
 
Person B will see Person A’s report and therefore each one’s earnings in this task at the end of the 
experiment. Person B will never know what the real computer-selected earnings outcome is throughout 
the experiment.  
 
At the end of the experiment, one Person B who has never been matched with Person A in the decision 
tasks will be randomly selected and this Person B will see the following information of your group:  
1) the real computer-selected earnings outcome in decision task 1  
2) Person A’s report. 
 
• Game T in No Justification Treatment 
In this task, you are randomly matched with another participant. One plays as Person A and the other 
plays as Person B. Person A’s and Person B’s final earnings are decided by the following steps:  
 
Step 1: Person B decides to either choose “In” or “Out.”  
 
• If Person B chooses “Out,” the final earnings for both Person A and Person B is $4 each. 
 
• If Person B chooses “In,” then the final earnings for Person A and Person B will be decided by the 
three steps described below.  
 
Step 2: In the case where Person B chooses “In,” the computer will select one of the following three 
possible earnings outcomes. Each of the following three earnings outcomes specifies Person A’s and 
Person B’s earnings.  
• Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9 
• Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7 
• Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2 
 
Step 3: Person A will see the computer-selected earnings outcome for his/her group. Person B will not 
see the computer-selected earnings outcome. Neither will B see the real computer-selected earnings 
outcome throughout today’s experiment.  
 
Step 4: Person A decides what to report to Person B regarding the computer-selected earnings outcome. 
Person A can choose either to tell the truth or tell a lie.   
If “In” is B’s actual choice in Step 1, A’s report will be carried out and A and B will receive earnings 
based on the earnings outcome A reports to B.  
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Note that Person A will not know whether Person B has chosen “In” or “Out” when deciding what 
earnings outcome to report to B. However, since A’s report will only make a difference when B has 
chosen “In,” we ask A to presume that B has chosen “In” for the purpose of making this decision. 
 
For example, suppose B chose “In” and the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group 
was: “A receives $7 and B receives $7.” After seeing this outcome:  
o If A told the truth and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is 
A receives $7 and B receives $7,” then A’s final earnings are $7 and B’s final earnings are 
$7.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $5 and B receives $9,” then A’s final earnings are $5 and B’s final earnings are $9.  
o If A told a lie and reported to B that “The true computer-selected earnings outcome is A 
receives $10 and B receives $2,” then A’s final earnings are $10 and B’s final earnings are 
$2.  
 
In the case where B’s actual choice in Step 1 is “In,” B will see A’s report and therefore each one’s 
earnings in this decision task at the end of the experiment. B will never know what the real computer-
selected earnings outcome is throughout the experiment.  In the case where B’s actual choice in Step 1 
is “Out,” B will not see either A’s report or the real computer-selected earnings outcome. In this case, A 
and B’s final earnings will be $4 each.  
 
At the end of the experiment,  one Person B who has never been matched with Person A in the decision 
tasks will be randomly selected and this Person B will review Person A’s report. This Person B will also 
be different than the Person B who was randomly selected to review Person A’s report in decision task 1. 
In particular, this Person B will see the following information of your group:  
3) the real computer-selected earnings outcome in decision task 2 
4) Person A’s report. 
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Appendix B. Survey  
• A sample of Person A’s survey in Game D 
The experiment is finished. Please answer the following questions. You can earn one point for some of 
the questions if your answer is correct. We will randomly select two of those questions and you will earn 
$2 for each point you earned.  
 
In Decision task 1, the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group was: Person A receives $10 
and Person B receives $2. You reported to Person B that the computer-selected earnings outcome was: …. 
 
At the end of the experiment, another Person B who has never been matched with you in any of the 
decision tasks saw the real computer-selected earnings outcome for your group in this task.  
 
1. Before seeing what you actually reported to your matched Person B, he/she was asked to guess what 
you would report. Please guess what this Person B’s answer is.  You will earn one point if your answer is 
the same as what this Person B answered in his/her survey.  
I think this Person B guessed that I would report: 
o Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9; 
o Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7; 
o Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2. 
2. Before seeing what you actually reported to your matched Person B, he/she was asked to indicate what 
he/she thought you should report. Please guess what this Person B’s answer is.  You will earn one point if 
your answer is the same as what this Person B answered in his/her survey. 
I think this Person B believed I should report: 
o Person A receives $5 and Person B receives $9; 
o Person A receives $7 and Person B receives $7; 
o Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2. 
3. After seeing what you actually reported to your matched Person B, he/she was asked to indicate to what 
extent he/she thought your report and your explanations were acceptable from "1=not acceptable at all" to 
"5=completely acceptable". Please guess what you think this Person B's answer is. You will earn one 
point for each answer that is the same as what Person B answered in his/her survey.   
I believe this Person B thought my report was: 
I believe this Person B thought my explanations were:  
4. For each of the following reports you could send to your matched Person B in Decision Task 1, please 
indicate to what extent you can explain why you think your report is the one you should send make from 
"1 = not easy at all" to "7 = very easy".   
--Report to Person B that the computer-selected earnings outcome is: Person A receives $5 and Person B 
receives $9 
--Report to Person B that the computer-selected earnings outcome is: Person A receives $7 and Person B 
receives $7 
--Report to Person B that the computer-selected earnings outcome is: Person A receives $10 and Person B 
receives $2 
5. We asked your matched Person B in Decision Task 1 how satisfied he/she is regarding the computer-
selected earnings outcomes you reported from "1 = not satisfied at all" to "7 = very satisfied".  Please 
guess what you think your matched Person B's answer is. You will earn one point for each answer that is 
the same as what Person B answered in his/her survey.   
I guess Person B’s answer is:  
6. We asked your matched Person B in Decision Task 1 what the probability is that the computer-selected 
earnings outcome you reported is the real one selected by the computer.  Please guess what you think 
your matched Person B's answer is. You will earn one point for each answer that is the same as what 
Person B answered in his/her survey.   
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I guess Person B’s answer is:  
o 0;  
o less than 50% but greater than 0;  
o 50% ;  
o greater than 50%;  
o 1 
 
• A sample of Person A’s survey in Game T 
In Decision task 2, in the case that B chose “In”, the computer-selected earnings outcome for your group 
was: Person A receives $10 and Person B receives $2. You reported to Person B that the computer-
selected earnings outcome was: … 
 
At the end of the experiment, another Person B who has never been matched with you in any of the 
decision tasks saw the real computer-selected earnings outcome for your group in this task.  
 
 (1-4 same as Game D) 
 
5. What do you think Person B chose? You will earn one point if your answer is correct.  
6. In the case that your matched Person B in Decision Task 2 chose “In”, he/she would see the computer-
selected earnings outcome you reported and be asked to indicate how satisfied he/she is with the report 
from "1 = not satisfied at all" to "7 = very satisfied".  Please guess what you think your matched Person 
B's answer is. You will earn one point for each answer that is the same as what Person B answered in 
his/her survey.   
I guess Person B’s answer is:  
7. In the case that your matched Person B in Decision Task 2 chose “In”, we asked him/her what the 
probability is that the computer-selected earnings outcome you reported is the real one selected by the 
computer.  Please guess what you think your matched Person B's answer is. You will earn one point for 
each answer that is the same as what Person B answered in his/her survey.   
I guess Person B’s answer is: 
o 0;  
o less than 50% but greater than 0;  
o 50% ;  
o greater than 50%;  
o 1 
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Appendix C. Messages table 
(Note: We tried to enforce the subjects to write a message to explain their decisions and also give 
them time to practice how to use the chat box in the software to record the messages. It turns out, 
however, four Person A’s only recorded a message for one of the games. Our results do not vary 
on whether to include these four observations or not.) 
 
Game D Game T 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives is $2 
because telling the truth is fair and these are the true outcomes.  
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because A and B receive even amounts and 
even amounts would be fair in this case.  
I decide to tell the lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earning outcome is A receives 10 and B receives 2 
because first I can earn more money; second I can be better off. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earning outcome is A receives 7 and 
B receives 7 because first we can be both better off; 
second it's better than A receives 10 and B receives 2. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first it is the truth and it is the fair share of the deals 
given. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first it was the truth and 
second it is a fair decision since both A and B will 
receive the same amount. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives 
$7"because first I want Person B to aware of the real situation 
and second I understand earnings by telling the truth will go a 
long way. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first I want Person B to be 
aware of the real situation and second earnings by 
telling the truth goes a long way. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I want more money; second B will not know if I lied or not. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first telling the truth is the 
right thing to do; second we both made equal amounts 
of money. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer- 
selected earnings outcome is A receives $5 and B receives $9 
because first, telling the truth is good; second A has an advantage 
of choosing the amount each person gets so it should be fair. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives$10 and B 
receives $2 because first, person A got rigged out of 
money; second person B had a choice to be OUT. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first lying gives me the most money; second I need $; third I 
don't see any negative outcomes for me lying to Person B. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first this is the most profitable 
decision for me; second there are no negative impacts of 
my myself totally disregarding everyone else's welfare. 
lying for my gain; third I am looking for the greatest 
amount of money for... 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I desire to make the most money I can; and second Person B 
will never know if I lied. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first, I want to make as much 
money as I can and second, B will never know that I 
lied. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $ 5 and B receives $ 9 
because first that is what the computer report states; second I'm 
just being truthful. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $ 5 
and B receives $ 9 because first that is what the 
computer reports; second I want to be truthful. 
I decide to tell the lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B received $2 
because first, I could earn more money than 5 dollars; second, I 
totally control the right to choose the level of the payment, so I 
I decide to tell the lie and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earning outcome is A received $10 
and B receives $2 because first, it is very possible that B 
choose out, so it doesn't matter whether I choose to  
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want to do something best to my benefit. tell the truth or tell the lie; second, I have chance to earn 
more money. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because I 
wanted to equally distribute the money and I was responsible for 
person B's earnings. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because it was the fairest distribution of the money, and 
I imagine that the person B I was matched with is a 
college student like me who is struggling to make 
money. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because I 
wanted to receive more money and I will never be paired with 
this person again. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because I wanted the extra money from my 
choice and I will not be paired with this person again. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I can earn more second, in order to earn more, i need to lie 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first I can earn more money second, 
the best benefit for me does not match the computer 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the computer decided 
to pay us each $7 because I think it's a fair decision, and B should 
also get the same amount that I'm getting 
I decided to tell the truth and give B $7 and retain $7 for 
myself Because I think it's fair that we both get the same 
share Irrespective of what the computer says 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first, the amount is fairly split between the 2 participants; 
second, I believe that  
being honest in such a case is the right thing to do, by my 
conscience. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first, the earnings have been 
fairly split between the persons; second, if person B  
had opted In, both A and B would stand to gain by this 
decision. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I wanted to receive the highest payoff from this decision that 
I could and second because  
I knew that person B would never know if I was lying or not. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first I wanted to receive the highest 
payoff that I could from this decision and second 
because I knew that person B would never know 
whether or not I was lying. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives 10 and B receives 2 because first 
I had the choice and second I need money 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives 10 and B 
receives 2 because first I had the choice; second it 
benefits me more 
I decided to lie and report to B that The rue computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
the computer chose less money for person A to receive and I 
want to maximize the amount I earn so I decided to send that 
message.  
I decided to tell a lie and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because the amount that person A 
receives in the computer's decision is less than the 
maximum amount and I want to maximize the amount I 
get so I decided to lie.  
i decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first this is the best outcome for me out off all three choices 
Second, Player B cannot do anything about this choice that I 
make, nor will he know if it is a truth or lie. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first this the best payoff for me for 
all three outcomes. Second, if person B chose in, he has 
no choice to affect my decision nor would he know if it 
was a truth or a lie, so I have no moral utility taken 
away for lying. 
I decide to tell the truth because first there is only a $4 difference 
in what B will get versus what I will receive; second I do not like 
to lie.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first this is a chance I could make 
$10; and second because I doubt person B will have 
chosen "out." 
 I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
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receives $2 because first I like lying; second I will earn 
more money. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because I received the maximum amount and because there is no 
reason to lie since deviating does not improve my position. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because in this scenario I would 
receive the maximum amount of money and there is no 
reason to lie since I cannot do any better by lying. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first to let B knows i am making more money. 
I decided to lie ($10, $2), because first I want to tell that 
the computer gave me more. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first this gives A and B equal shares which is fair, and second the 
computer-selected earnings outcome gave me 'A' less than B. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first the true computer-selected 
earnings gave me 'A' less, and second this gives A and B 
equal shares. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives$7 because first 
it is the option I would choose no matter what because it makes 
the most sense, second because if I were B this is the option I 
would want A to choose. 
i decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first it seems to be fair to receive 
the same amount of money and second I would want 
them to pick the same thing if they were A no matter 
what. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $ because 
first, this option has the highest earnings for me; second, person 
B does not have the opportunity to change the outcome of this 
decision.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and Person 
B receives $2 because first, if person B chooses in, I will 
receive the most amount of money possible; second, if 
Person B chooses out, I will only receive $1 less than if 
I told the truth. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the computer-selected earning 
outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because first I want 
A to make the most money and second because I prefer even 
numbers. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first I wanted to earn the most 
money for Person A and second because I thought it 
would produce better results for the experiment. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives 7 and B receives 7 
because first, it is the truth, and second it is fair. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives 7 and 
B receives 7 because first, it is the truth, and second it is 
fair. 
decided to tell the truth and report to B that The ture computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first any different decision I make would influence B's 
decision, second if B knew of my decisions, B would build some 
sort of trust. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that (7,7) 
because first I don't want any difference in decisions 
affect B's decision of either choosing In or Out, second I 
want B to trust me 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, I am only interested in making as much money as possible 
and second, I have no idea who the other person is, so I have no 
problem reducing their earnings 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives 10 and B 
receives 2 because first, I am only interested in getting 
the most money for myself and second, I do not know 
who person B is so I have no desire to do something that 
benefits them. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because the voices in my head tell me it is so 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because that is what has been earned 
according the computer because I say so 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first it is the highest possible reward for for everyone and 
second because it is the most fair choice 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that. The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first it is fair for both 
participants and second because if I lie I think it would 
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be obvious. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and b receives $2 
because it was the true computer-selected outcome and because I 
came here to make as much money as possible today. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and b receives $2 because it was the true computer-
selected outcome and because I came here to make as 
much money as possible today. 
I decided to tell the truth an report to Person B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $5 and B 
receives $9.First because I do not believe in lying. This activity 
was completely random so I should not try to cheat the person B 
out of money that is technically theirs. Second because the scale 
of money is quite small therefore lying to someone is still 
completely unjustified. If the scale of money was larger for 
example one person gets $100 and the other gets $2, I may end 
up choosing  a different selection because I would feel that the 
selection process was unfair 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $5 
and B receives $9. Because first, if person B decided to 
choose the "in" option, they should be willing to deal  
with the consequences. Second, I do not believe in lying 
to someone. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first of all I want to make the most money I can but have regard 
for others and secondly I feel it is only fair to have it be evenly 
divided between both participants. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first I want to try and get the most 
money for me but second i think it is only fair for it to 
be even.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10.00 and B receives $2.00 
Because first, I get more money and second person B will never 
know that I lied or who I am. 
I decide to lie and report to person B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because first I get more money and 
second they will never know who I am or what the 
actual number was. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first this situation allows both to earn the same amount and 
second i didn’t think it was fair the B earned more than A. 
I decided to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because in this scenario we both received 
the same amount of money.I also felt it was unfair that 
B would receive more money than A 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, I picked A receives $10 and B receives $2 because the real 
computer-selected earnings is not the biggest for A, so I should 
pick the highest probable outcome; second, I don't have to lie 
when the real computer-selected outcome is greatest for me, I lie 
just because I can get the highest earnings. 
I decide to lie and report B that The try computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first my decision will only matter 
when B chooses "In,” so I should choose the biggest 
earnings for me to lie to maximize my earnings. 
me in case B chooses "in"; second B will not see if I lie 
or not, so it's ok  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first B cannot see my decisions, and thus cannot retaliate in any 
way, and second I am trying to maximize my own profits. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives 10 and B 
receives $2 because I am trying to maximize my own 
profits, and because s/he cannot see my decisions or tell 
that I am lying.  In effect, there is no reason not to lie 
about the outcome unless the outcome is actually A 
receives 10 and B receives 2.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I make an additional $3 by lying and second because I do not 
know Person B so I do not feel bad for lying. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first it will give me more money 
and second because B is anonymous so I do not feel bad 
not sharing the money. 
I decide to lie and report that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I remembered I am in debt with a friend and need to make as 
much money as possible; second because  
I told the truth in decision task 1. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first I am an honest person; 
second I want Person B to feel rewarded for taking a 
chance by choosing "In.” 
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I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
First, the earnings are based on what I choose to report to B 
regardless of what the computer-selected earnings outcome is. 
Second, I would like to maximize my earnings and receive $10 
because I know that it will not harm me in this Decision Task 2 
to lie. Third, any other outcome would make me worse off. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because...first, knowing that if B chooses in 
and the earnings result is whatever I decide, I would like 
Second, I know that there are no consequences if I lie 
because even if B chooses Out, then I will still receive 
$4. I hope that B chooses In so that I maximize earnings. 
to receive the highest earnings for myself which would 
be $10. 
I decide to tell a lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because first, it does not seem to matter what the computer 
actually selects, only what I report; second, you will probably 
never know who I am; third, if you do, and I end up with ten and 
you two, I'll buy you something  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is Person A receives $10 and 
Person B receives $2 because first, I have already earned 
$5 by just being here and have nothing to lose, second,  
because I have to assume B chose In anyway and might 
as well earn $10 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2. Firstly, 
because it is always better to tell the truth than lie, and this was 
random so I am not to blame for the computers selection. 
Secondly, B has no input on how much money they make, and I 
want to maximize my profits so telling the truth benefits me. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2. Firstly, I believe it is better to tell the 
truth than a lie. And secondly, if B chose IN,  
then I am in control of the earnings, and I realize this 
benefits only me, and I have the power to make our 
earnings equal, but I would rather take the computer 
allotted money than lie. 
it feels wrong to take the $10 both times so i just did it once i just realized that i am out of cigarettes; i want to go to 
get a five guys; person b's taking a risk;i was nice to the 
last person b 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first, I believe that honesty is always the best policy and 
lying just makes everything  
worse; second it is only fair that both A and B receive 7 dollars 
each 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives  $7 
and B receives $7 because first I believe honesty is the 
best policy and lying always gets you in trouble; second 
it was fair. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives 10 and B receives 2 because first 
they will never know the true computer selection and second this 
results in my earnings being higher 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first I would be earning the most 
money possible; second I believe that B will choose 
"Out" and this decision will ultimately not matter. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7, 
because first i do not want to cheat him; second i think it's fair for 
us to earn the same amount. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7, because first i want to tell the truth 
instead of lying to him; second i love the number 7. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, I want to earn more money by telling person B that the true 
outcome is different than  what it actually was and second, I did 
not like the true outcome that was selected by the computer. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first, I want to earn more money 
than the computer-selected answer would have provided 
me and second, I did not like the computer-selected 
answer that was chosen. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first both get an equal amount and second I want more money.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first I want B to earn more than $4 
for choosing In and second I want more money. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The True computer -selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, this outcome earns more money for person A; second, 
person B will not see the original outcome.  
I decide to lie and report to b that the true computer-
selected outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because first, the truth would result in me only receiving 
$5 and second, person B will never know the true 
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computer-selected outcome.  
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is Person A receives $10 and Person B receives 
$2 because first, I am person A and will benefit economically 
from this choice and second,  
the outcome of the computer has no bearing on what I report, be 
it true or not. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is Person A receives 10$ and 
Person B receives 2$ because first, if they have chosen 
"in" I will make 6$ more and second because, again,  
I have to power to chose my own outcome without the 
threat of any consequences. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives 10 dollars and B receives 
2 dollars because first, this outcome maximizes my profit; 
second, I have no reason  to lie in a case where I am already 
earning the most money possible in this situation 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B received $2 because I wanted to maximize my 
profit in this situation by creating a circumstance where  
I could possibly earn 10 dollars and secondly because I 
have no reason to lie if I am already getting the most 
money 
I decide to lie and report to B that  The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2  because 
first I would like more money than less money; second ten 
dollars will pay for lunch; third  
I did poorly in the last experiment 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first the group makes more 
money in whole; second two dollars is not very much.I 
decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first the group makes more 
money in whole; second two dollars is not very much.I 
decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first the I chose differently 
last time; second the difference between seven and ten is 
not much. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I have a bunch of laundry to do tonight; second I have no 
incentive to tell the truth; 
I decide to lie and report to B the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because first I need laundry money tonight; second no 
consequence for me taking the money 
I decide to lie and report to B that T he true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first if i lied to B I can earn more money than i tell the truth, 
second I can earn more money than B if i tell the lie 
i decide to tell the truth and report to B that The truth 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $6 because first the money in the truth is 
not too little, second if I tell the truth we can both get 
same money. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, B will not see the true computer-selected earnings outcome 
so it will not affect how B  
will think of A and second, this will benefit me, A, for the final 
earnings anyway. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first, if B had chosen "In," B knew 
that there was a chance (1/3) that B would not get more 
than $4 (as if he had chosen "out"), but that chance is 
less than the chance (2/3) that B would get more than 
$4. Therefore, it is a chance that B will have to take, 
however the final earnings. So if B had chosen "in," A's 
lie is just that B's loss that B has to bear. Second, Person 
B that I, person A, is matched with will not see the true 
computer-selected earnings and yet the final earnings is 
based on person A's report, therefore, for the final 
earnings, I chose to lie in order for me to get the most 
money out of it.  
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I would benefit from this decision; second I wanted to lie.  
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first it benefits me; and second I 
wanted to lie. 
I decide to lie and report to B that  The true computer-selected I decide to lie and report to B that  The true computer-
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earnings outcome is A receievs$7 and B receives $7 because 
first, I think it's fair for us to earn the same amount ; second is I 
consider $7 as a good balance  
in return as nobody does more work. 
selected earning outcomes is A receives$7 and B 
receives$7 because first I think it's fair to earn the same 
amount of money as no one does more work; second, $7 
is better than $4, as he/she takes the risk to choose "in" 
regardless that I can choose to give him/her only $2, I 
think $7 is good in return. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first B will not know who I am; second B will be paired with 
someone else in a different task. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because B is a different person than in 
decision 1; second because B will not find out who I am. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first I want more money and second this seems more fair. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B  
receives $7 because first this is beneficial for both 
parties if B has decided to stay in and second it only 
seems fair that we both receive the same amount. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first I want more money than B; second player B will never know 
who I am so it makes it easier to be selfish.  
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first I want the most possible 
amount of money; second person B will not know who I 
am so it makes it easier to be selfish. 
i decide to lie and report to b that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is a receives $10  and B receives $2 first 
because it i want to disagree with the computer and second 
because it gives player a more money 
i decide to tell the truth and report to b that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because first i was told not to lie and 
second because that is what the computer told me. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because (first) it is the truth and (second) I have a better chance 
of receiving $10 than if  
I chose either of the other two options. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because (first) this is actually the truth 
and (second) I know that if B chose "In,” I will receive 
$10 which is the most money that I can earn in this 
decision. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-based 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because I 
will make the most money this way; B will not know the true 
computer-selected earnings 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because I will earn the most this way; B will 
never know the computer-selected earnings 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 because 
first it is equal so we both receive the same thing and second it's 
more of a fair decision than one person making more than the 
other. 
I decided to lie and report to B that  the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first we both receive an equal 
amount of money and second i want more than $5 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first, the outcome is fair because we both receive $7 and, 
second, I have no reason  
to be greedy and deny another person who might need the money 
more than I do. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first, I like the outcome so 
see no reason to lie and, second, is fair for both of us. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first this option will earn me the most money which is my goal 
for this decision; second person B will not know whether or not I 
tell the truth and will have to assume that the reported earnings 
are the truth. 
 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first it is the most beneficial for both of us and second 
because if they decided to trust me my saying "in,” then i should 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first it's the fairest way for us 
both to get paid an even amount and second because  
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at least give them their fair cut for playing their part. if they did their bit and pressed "in" then i'll do mine and 
split things evenly 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because both the parties receive equal amount; I don't want to 
gain at other's expense. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because it is fair for both parties; the 
next person B will choose "IN" as he knows I will 
choose to be fair. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, I wanted to maximize my payoffs. Second, I wanted to earn 
more than $7, the computer-selected earnings outcome for me. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receiver $10 and B 
receives $2 because it would maximize my payoffs. I 
am assuming B is choosing “In" so I want to receive $10 
as opposed to $7. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first it is the optimal choice (biggest benefit) in my position and 
secondly if Person B does not know I lied than there is no reason 
for me not to in this situation. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first it is the truth. If Player B 
leaves it to the computer to choose, than I will respect 
their wishes and secondly $7 each is the most optimal 
way ($14 total > $12 and more fair than 9 for me and 5 
for player b) to divide the total amount of winnings. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, as the earnings are determined by what person one reports it 
is more beneficial to me to report the highest earnings possible, 
and second, there is no downside for me to tell a fib. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B 
receives $2 because first, As I am person a it is more 
beneficial from me to receive $10 in earnings rather than 
$7 and second, If the person in actuality chose out then 
this is a moot point so there is no reason to not risk it 
and go for the big bucks. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because I really don't see a need to lie here. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because this will make it seem fair. 
I decide to lie and report to B that the true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $ 2 because 
first, I can make more money that way, and second I kept it fair 
the first time.  
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first, it was the real computer 
decision and second, it is a fair choice for both of us.  
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because first that statement maximizes my payoff; second I have 
no reason to state otherwise since I would both be lying and 
reducing my payoff. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because first that report results in the 
maximum payoff for me; second because I have no 
reason to report otherwise since I would both be lying 
and lowering my payoff. 
I decide to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first that gives me the most money; second there are no 
repercussions to me for this action 
 
I decide to tell a lie and report to B that the true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 
because first I wanted to increase my earnings from $5 to $10 
and secondly, I wanted to decrease  
B's earnings from $9 to $2. 
I decide to lie and report to person B that the true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $10 
and B receives $2 because first I wanted to increase my 
earnings from $5 to $10 and second I wanted to 
decrease B's earnings from $9 to $2. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and b receives $7 
because first person B gave me the chance to earn more than the 
original $4 and I do not want to jip them out of money; second it 
is equal for both participants to earn the same amount of money 
in this experiment regardless of person B's choice to choose in or 
out 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because first the computer has chosen 
$7 for each person and this is maximizing overall utility;  
second to make each person get an equal amount $7 is 
the best way to do so 
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I Decide to tell the truth and report to Person B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first I feel like it is a fair outcome to have; 
second I feel that person B should know the true outcome. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first I feel like it is the most fair 
outcome; second I feel that it it is important to report the 
actual outcome. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first it's the truth; Second 3 dollars is not worth telling a 
lie. 
i decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $ 7 because first, it's fair; second, 3 
dollars difference does not worth to tell a lie. 
 I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $8 
and B receives $8 because firstly this is what I would 
have chosen anyways. Since it is free money, it should 
be distributed fairly and no one person deserves more 
free money than another. Secondly, since the majority of 
people do not trust people they don't know, I am 
expecting person B to choose out, so my choice really 
doesn't matter at all. 
I decided to lie and report to B that The true computer-selected 
earnings outcome is A receives $10 and B receives $2 because 
first, person B does not know the real outcome of the result; 
second, there is a greater chance that person B decided to chose 
the OUT option. This would end up losing me money 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 
and B receives $7 because:first it is only fair that each 
person receives the same amount of money; second, no 
one will be negatively affected by not telling the truth in 
this case 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that  The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7.00 and B receives 
$7.00 because this way both participants receive the same 
amount of money, and it is always good to tell the truth. 
I decide to tell the truth and report to B that The true 
computer-selected earnings outcome is A receives $7.00 
and B receives $7.00 because this way both A and B 
receive $7.00, and the truth is told, which is always a 
good thing to do. 
I decided to tell the truth and report to B that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B receives $7 
because first, we are both in this study to make money so why 
not make equal amounts; second  
I feel that it is fair for both of us to make the same amount. 
I decided to tell the truth that The true computer-
selected earnings outcome is A receives $7 and B 
receives $7 because first, we are both in the experiment 
to make money so why not have us make the same 
amount; second  
I feel that it is fair for us both make the same amount. 
 
 
